Magnanimity Generally

  • As Aristotle does, St. Thomas explains that the mediate concern of magnanimity is what is great which is difficult to attain, since “magnanimity from its name signifies a certain extension of the soul to great things,” and, particularly, the highest external thing which comes into man’s use, namely, honor, since it is awarded to the virtuous, to the best, and to God.
    • This cites in (ST II-II,q.129,a.1,c.) & Nichomachean Ethics, bk.2,ch.8,l.1107b.23
    • Is it true?
      • Two things to consider, external things of use and the Greatest of these things
        • For Philosophers and Christians, interior things are far higher and more desirable than external things
          • only that which is internal can be said to be the more final ends which we pursue
        • Is it the greatest of external things?
          • This seems surprising, that “the highest external things which comes into man’s use” is honor.
          • Can honor really be higher than other external things?
            • It seems higher than honor would be community?
              • but it is through honor that one comes into community…
            • It seems higher than honor would be dignity?
              • But honor is given in response to dignity?
                • potentially how dignity is understood, honor is given for excellence, for something which is really superior. It seems dignity would be the ontological assessment of the state of a superior thing. Honor is noetic assessment of that thing

General Quotations

For magnanimity, the formal motive is to encourage man to strive for his proper good according to his abilities, lest he fail to pursue a good of which he is worthy.
- ST II-II,q.129, a.1,c. & a.4,c. & a.4,ad.4
For humility, however, the formal motive is subjection to God out of reverence for Him: “The principle reason for restraining the presumption of hope is based on divine reverence, which shows that man should not attribute to himself more than is competent to him according to his position which God has allotted him. Therefore, it would seem that humility above all denotes the subjection of man to God.”
- ST II-II,q.161,a.2,ad.3

moral virtue operates according to right reason
virtus moralis operatur secundum rationem rectam
ST I-II,q.56,a.2,ad.2
prudence is “right reasoning concerning things to be done”
(recta ratio agibilium)
ST I-II,q.57,a.4,c. \

In man, two things can be considered, that is to say, that which is God’s, and that which is man’s.
In homine duo possunt considerari, scilicet id quod est Dei, et id quod est hominis.
ST II-II, q. 161, a. 3, c.
GLOSS: “Whatever pertains to his imperfection is proper to man because of his sin, whatever pertains to his perfection belongs to God because He is the source of man’s gifts.”

Humilitas, sicut et ceterae virtutes, praecipue interius in anima consistit.
- ST II-II,q.161,a.3,ad.3

Et sic humilitas primum locum tenet, inquantum scilicet expellit superbiam … Et secundum hoc, humilitas dicitur spiritualis aedificii fundamentum.
- ST II-II,q.161,a.5,ad.2

Respondeo dicendum quod triplex est pars: scilicet integralis, ut paries, tectum, et fundamentum sunt partes domus; subiectiva, sicut bos et leo sunt partes animalis; et potentialis, sicut nutritivum et sensitivum sunt partes animae.”
- ST II-II, q. 48, a. 1, c.

Aristotle’s account of Magnanimous man
Although he is deserving of honor and justly claims it, he does so in moderation, looking upon what is great such as wealth, power, and good fortune in such a way that he is “neither exalted by prosperity nor cast down by misfortune. NE 4.9.1124a.13-16
In fact, he really does not even regard honor itself as a particularly great thing, but desires only that he is truly worthy of high honors. NE 4.9.1124a.18
He is courageous in deeds of great valor.11 He is a man of few deeds, waiting for occasion to do great acts of virtue.12 |11 NE 4.10.1124b.6-9 |12 NE 4.10.1124b.22-25
He speaks and acts openly towards friends and enemies, since he cares more for the truth than the opinions of others. NE 4.10.1124b.22-30
He forgets injuries done to him, since he despises evil, refrains from gossip, is not anxious about giving and receiving praise or blame, and is uninterested in trivial matters, but only in those that bear great weight. NE 4.10.1125a.2-7
St. Thomas glossing Aristotle
Thus, his apparent ingratitude is transformed into super exceeding gratitude, since “it is not pleasing to him that he accept favors from others, unless he repay them with a greater favor; this belongs to the perfection of gratitude, in the act of which he desires to excel, as in the acts of other virtues.” ST II-II,q.129,a.3,ad.5
magnanimity regards two things: honor, which is its matter, and doing something great, which is its end.
- ST II-II,q.129,a.8,c
Magnanimity is about honor, as evidently he strives to do those things which are worthy of honor, however, not so that he may esteem too greatly the honors of man.
- ST II-II,q.162,a.1,ad.3 \

NOTE

There is an aspect where a magnanimous man distains honor, other than those who are honorable. It seems this would be God above all else, “who sees not as man sees.”

==Magnanimity makes man deem himself worthy of great things, considering the gifts which he possesses from God.==
- ST II-II,q.129,a.3,ad.4

~ My own notes, so not by looking out, but by looking up

the Philosopher intended to discuss virtues according as they are ordered to the civic life … ==Humility, however, considered as a special virtue, chiefly regards the subjection of man to God==
ST II-II,q.161,a.1,ad.5

apparent contradiction between humility and magnanimity, since magnanimity pursues great things and humility flees them
ST II-II,q.161,a.1,arg.3

Magnanimity makes man deem himself worthy of what is great in consideration of the gifts that he possesses from God. If he has great virtue in his soul, magnanimity makes him tend toward perfect works of virtue … Humility, however, makes man think himself little considering his defects. Likewise, magnanimity holds others in contempt insofar as they have fallen away from the gifts of God, for it does not esteem others so highly that he does wrong for them. But humility honors others, and sees them as superior, insofar as it sees in others the gifts of God … Thus, it follows that magnanimity and humility are not contrary, although they seem to be contrary, they proceed according to different considerations.
- ST II-II,q.129,a.3,ad.4

the reason why Christ chiefly commended humility to us was because, through it the impediment to man’s salvation which consists in man’s aiming at heavenly and spiritual things is greatly removed.
- ST II-II,q.161,a.5,ad.4

Magnanimity specifically

Humility

Humility moderates hope{p}, while magnanimity confirms hope{v}
hope{p} vs hope{v} :: passion vs virtue

man’s perfection in virtue is only perfect in a relative sense, such that, in comparison with God, his perfection is insignificant

In man are two things, blended together
Council Orange II - Sin and lying, “…lying and sin” canon 22

Priesthood

Studies


Sources:

Henri Grenier Vol3, Morals

  • this seems only ok, not remarkably helpful, though makes many individual claims.